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The European Union (EU) has a number of different powers in its toolbox. One of these policies
lies at the core of the EU’s external competences – the common commercial policy (CCP) or
common trade policy. This enables the EU to ‘speak as one voice’ in multilateral bodies and with
third parties. The CCP, which has become stronger over the years, has developed into one of the
bloc’s key international projection levers. However, the EU’s place and role in globalization are
today being shaken chiefly by three major political factors: the rise of new powers, the United
States (US)’ neo-mercantilist policies, and political divisions within the EU. Together, these
three external and internal factors may be hastening a crisis for the EU. This raises the question:
to what extent can the bloc influence its own destiny during this stormy period?
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1 INTRODUCTION
Recent decades have seen multiple upheavals and changes in the structures of the
global order. The bipolar world’s collapse for a while resulted in a unipolar world,
now replaced by an increasingly multipolar order. Worldwide there has been a
speeding up of the spread of power, as well as of the globalization that exacerbates
international competition. Given these changes, international players – including
the European Union (EU) – are seeking to find their marks. The EU has a number
of different powers in its toolbox. Its international field of action ranges from
addressing environmental issues to civil crisis management, humanitarian action
and development assistance. Moreover the bloc has strategies to ensure its
presence in multilateral (World Trade Organization) organizations or fora (G201
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1 International forum comprising the governments and central banks of nineteen countries (South
Africa, Germany, Saudi Arabia, Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, South Korea, United
States, France, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, United Kingdom, Russia, Turkey) and the EU,
or G72) as a member or observer (United Nations Organization),3 and to develop a
deep network of relations with regional organizations plus developing countries
and major powers.4 One of these policies lies at the core of the EU’s external
competences – the common commercial policy (CCP) or common trade policy.
This enables the EU to ‘speak as one voice’ in multilateral bodies and with third
parties. The CCP, which has become stronger over the years, has developed into
one of the bloc’s key international projection levers.
However, the EU’s place and role in globalization are today being shaken
chiefly by three major political factors: the rise of new powers, the United States
(US)’ neo-mercantilist policies, and political divisions within the EU. Together,
these three external and internal factors may be hastening a crisis for the EU.5 A
crisis here can be understood in the Chinese sense of the term, where uncertain
periods are seen as opportunities to reconsider the future in a different way. This
raises the question: to what extent can the bloc influence its own destiny during
this stormy period?
With the above in mind, this article has chosen to focus mainly on the actions
undertaken by the EU in commercial policy. Initially, it will look at the springs of
the EU’s commercial policy in terms of external influence. Secondly, it will assess
the avenues taken by the bloc to forge its own place in globalization. The last part
of the article will analyse the three factors (diffusion of power, trade war, cen-
trifugal forces) that are undermining the EU’s commercial strength. A further aim
of this article is to highlight the EU’s responses to the potential risks of seeing its
place and influence changed on the international stage. The conclusion includes an
assessment of the EU’s future as a commercial power in the current European and
international contexts.
2 EU TRADE POLICY AS A LEVER OF GLOBAL INFLUENCE
The EU is an economic, institutional and political entity sui generis based on
the voluntary membership of its States. Over the last thirty years, the bloc’s
construction has seen many different pitfalls and crises (political, financial,
and representing 85% of global GDP, 2/3 of the world’s population, 75% of global trade, 80% of
global investment and 92% of global expenditure on R&D.
2 The group includes Germany, Canada, United States, France, Italy, Japan and the United Kingdom.
The EU has been associated with the G7’s work since 1977. This group represents 40% of global GDP
and 10% of the world’s population.
3 H. Ojanen, The EU’s Power in Inter-Organisational Relations 231 (London, Palgrave Macmillan 2018).
4 S. Santander, L’Union européenne, l’interrégionalisme et les puissances émergentes: le cas du partenariat ‘euro-
brésilien’, 39 Politique européenne 106–135 (2013).
5 I. T. Berend, The Contemporary Crisis of the European Union: Prospects for the Future 170 (London,
Routledge 2017).
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economic, security or migration).6 Yet oddly, this is the period when it has
enjoyed the biggest expansion and deepening in its history. The treaties of
Maastricht (1992), Amsterdam (1997), Nice (2000) and Lisbon (2009) each
contributed to building today’s EU and further enlarging its competencies,
thus enabling the bloc to increasingly assert itself as an actor on the global
stage.
The EU’s tools allow it to take action in the fields of security and defence,
to play a role in international trade, development and humanitarian areas, and
to foster close links with other actors that are geographically close or far away,
such as through the bloc’s enlargement and neighbourhood policies or its
diplomatic relations. Furthermore, several of the EU’s internal policies include
an external part (euro, environment, single market, and visas). In short, the EU
today boasts a wide range of policies covering the key challenges of current
international action.7
These assets enable the bloc to play a role globally, but its actions do not
all have the same impact in every area of foreign policy. Although some of the
EU’s policies struggle to make an impact, others allow the EU to project itself
as an international power, as underlined by the CCP.8 This policy can be found
in almost all of the EU’s external policies and it is part of the bloc’s exclusive
competencies – thanks to which the bloc can participate in international trade
talks, on behalf of its Member States. As a result of its weight in the interna-
tional economy (15% of global trade and the biggest exporter of agricultural
goods, manufactured goods and services) – plus its capacity to speak with one
voice and to act in a united fashion in this area – the EU is recognized by the
rest of the world as a leading trade power. All this in spite of the increasingly
decentralized power of the global political economy due to the rise of (re)
emerging powers and the new trade agenda of the US under Donald Trump
(see below).
6 Europe’s Crises 476 (M. Castells et al. eds, Polity Pres, 2017).
7 Cf. C. Bretherton & J. Vogler, The European Union as a Global Actor 273 (Routledge 2006); F.
Petiteville, La politique internationale de l’Union européenne 280 (Paris, Les Presses Sciences Po 2006);
M. Telò & F. Ponjaert, The EU’s Foreign Policy. What Kind of Power and Diplomatic Action? 248 (Ashgate
2013); La Unión Europea en las Relaciones Internacionales 443 (E. Barbé ed., Madrid, Tecnos 2014); S.
Keukeleire & T. Delreux, The Foreign Policy of the European Union 408 (New York, Palgrave Macmillan
2014); M. Smit, S. Keukeleire & S. Vanhoonaker, The Diplomatic System of the European Union 310
(Routledge 2016).
8 J. Orbie, The European Union’s Role in World Trade: Harnessing Globalisation?, in Europe’s Global Role
35–66 (J. Orbie ed., Ashgate 2008); P. A. Messerlin & P. Boulanger, La politique commercial, in L’Union
européenne 289–300 (R. Dehousse ed., La documentation française 2014); S. Meunier & K. Nicolaïdis,
The European Union as a Trade Power, in International Relations and the European Union 209–234 (C. Hill,
M. Smith & S. Vanhoonaker eds, 3d ed., Oxford, Oxford University Press 2017).
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3 EU AT THE FOREFRONT OF GLOBALIZATION
3.1 THE MULTILATERAL WAY
Aware of the strong attraction of its single market on outside actors, the EU makes
full use of this in its relations with the rest of the world. The European
Commission, as the body in charge of the CCP, negotiates access to the EU’s
single market in exchange for the protection of intellectual property, access to
public procurement, liberalization of investments and services, legal security for
European companies as well as the acceptance of its industrial and trade standards.9
To that end, the EU has no hesitation in pursuing a dual-track strategy or in using
two main paths: the multilateral path and the bilateral/interregional one.
Firstly, any investment in developing global interdependence depends on
one’s commitment to trade multilateralism. Clearly, since the setting up of the
World Trade Organization (WTO, 1995), the EU’s trade policy has become
proactive regarding trade multilateralism. The EU’s institutions identify themselves
with multilateralism to the extent that they view this as a set of peaceful mechan-
isms for managing and monitoring international affairs as well as for safeguarding
against unilateral temptations. The EU and its Member States consider multi-
lateralism as the main way to frame globalization and thus as a means for boosting
their international influence. This explains why the bloc seeks to play key roles in
the development and legitimization of multilateral economic institutions such as
the WTO.
Therefore, the EU today increasingly opts for multilateral negotiations at the
WTO, with a view to creating common standards in e-commerce. These negotia-
tions – which place the WTO at the heart of international rule-making for a form
of trade that has grown exponentially over the last two decades – started in late
January 2019, including the EU and forty-eight other members of the organiza-
tion. Moreover the EU has emerged as the main international driving force for
establishing a multilateral investment tribunal. This judicial system would be tasked
with resolving disputes under future and existing investment treaties. Likewise, the
EU is charting the multilateral path to reform of international tax rules. This
reform would be tailored to the realities of the digital economy, in order to
establish a closer link between how value is created and where it is taxed. Here
the EU supports the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
9 L. Cohen-Tanugi, The European Union’s International Normative Influence: A Constrained Ambition?, Ifri
56 (2002); Z. Laïdi, Norm Over Force. The Enigma of European Power 179 (Palgrave Macmillan 2008); B.
Hettne & F. Söderbaum, Civilian Power or Soft Imperialism? EU as a Global Actor and the Role of
Interregionalism, 10(4) Eur. Foreign Aff. Rev. 535–552 (2005);S. Santander, Le régionalisme sud-
américain, l’Union européenne et les États-Unis 280 (Éditions de l’Université de Bruxelles 2008).
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(OECD) as an international institution capable of hosting a legal instrument to
regulate digital globalization.10
3.2 BILATERAL AND INTERREGIONAL CHANNELS
The EU also involves itself in world trade through other channels. The gradual
exhaustion of the WTO’s multilateral negotiating model11 has encouraged leading
commercial powers like the EU to focus their trade policy priorities at other
levels,12 without necessarily abandoning multilateralism completely.13 While striv-
ing to make as few agricultural concessions as possible, the EU thus seeks to impose
its ambitious agenda through multiple agreements that it signs with countries or
regional groups in the Western Balkans, Eastern Europe, Latin America, Asia, and
the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) nations. From 2008 to 2019, the EU
therefore concluded a series of major bilateral or interregional preferential trade
agreements, notably with the Caribbean Forum of African, Caribbean and Pacific
States (CARIFORUM)14 (2008), South Korea (2010), Central American
countries15 (2012), Colombia, Ecuador and Peru (2014), Canada (2016), the
Southern African Development Community (2016),16 Japan (2017), Singapore
(2018) and Vietnam (2019).
Recently and notably in the aftermath of the uncertainties affecting the WTO
and world trade as well as the twin threats posed by Brexit and the US’ neo-
mercantilist policy towards European cohesion (see below), the EU has committed
to speed up the upgrading of its trade alliances and to further diversify its trade
agreements. This is true for its relations with governments in Asia as well as
10 A. Vlassis, Partenariats transrégionaux, technologies numériques et culture: de la convergence numérique aux
divergences normatives, in Génération TAFTA. Les nouveaux partenariats de la mondialisation 211–223
(C Deblock & J. Lebullenger, PUR 2018).
11 S. Woolcock European Union Economic Diplomacy the Role of the EU in External Economic Relations 220
(Routledge 2012); F. Petiteville, Les négociations multilatérales à l’OMC: l’épuisement d’un modèle, in
Négociations internationales 345–371 (F. Petiteville & D. Placidi-Frot eds, Presses de Sciences Po 2013);
D. Colgan, D. Jeff & R. O. Keohane, The Liberal Order Is Rigged, Foreign Aff. 36–45 (May/June
2017).
12 T. Renard, Partnerships for Effective Multilateralism? Assessing the Compatibility Between EU Bilateralism,
(Inter-)Regionalism and Multilateralism, 29(1) Cambridge Rev. Int’l Aff. 18–35 (2015); M. Telò, L’Union
européenne face à la multiplication des interconnexions commerciales interrégionales et à leurs implications
politiques, in Deblock & Lebullenger, supra n. 10, at 37–54.
13 European Commission, A Global Actor in Search of a Strategy: European Union Foreign Policy Between
Multilateralism and Bilateralism, Directorate-Gen. Res. & Innovation 63 (2014); R. Bendini, The Future
of the EU Trade Policy, European Parliament PE 549.054, 28 (July 2015).
14 Group bringing together fifteen Caribbean countries: the CARICOM countries and Dominican
Republic.
15 Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Salvador.
16 The Southern African Development Community comprises Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique,
Namibia, South Africa and Eswatini (formerly Swaziland).
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Oceania and Latin America. For instance, in 2018 European negotiators started
commercial talks with Australia and New Zealand with the goal of further redu-
cing the existing customs barriers and optimizing access to those countries’ services
and public procurement. From a European standpoint, these trade agreements
should above all promote sectors like automotive equipment, machines, chemical
products, food industry and services. However, the EU also has interests that it
wants to defend and protect. Hence the mandates for negotiation given to the
European Commission aim to provide full protection for EU agriculture from
Australian and New Zealand competition. The Commission also has a mandate to
negotiate with these two countries on relational frameworks based on the strictest
standards for the protection of workers, security, the environment and consumer
protection.17
Since 2016, the EU has been busy negotiating with countries in South-East
Asia, in order to complete a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement
(CEPA) with Indonesia. The objective is to facilitate and generate new opportu-
nities for market access. European negotiators are pushing for a whole range of
standards to be adopted with regard to health and plant health measures as well as
for rules of origin and investment.18
European authorities are making the most of Latin America’s greater openness
to economic and trade liberalism since 2015, by working on new trade
discussions.19 The EU has launched new rounds of negotiations with the aim of
modernizing this trade pillar of the association agreements that the bloc has had
with Chile and Mexico20 since 2005 and 2000 respectively. With Chile, the EU
wants to extend the agreement to cover aspects of trade and investment that the
EU negotiators consider ‘important’ for the interests of Europeans. This would
cover specific provisions on investment, non-tariff barriers, intellectual property
protection, safeguarding certain European geographical indications or contributing
to sustainable development.21 For the negotiations with Mexico, European autho-
rities are eager to remove a series of non-tariff barriers (Mexican restrictions on
17 Council of the EU, Trade with Australia and New Zealand: Negotiating Directives Made Public, Council of
the European Union (25 June 2018), https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/
2018/06/25/trade-with-australia-and-new-zealand-negotiating-directives-made-public/ (accessed 20
June 2019).
18 Council of the EU, EU-Indonesia Free Trade Agreement: Negotiations to Start, Council of the European
Union (18 July 2016), https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/07/18/eu-
indonesia-free-trade-agreement/ (accessed 20 June 2019).
19 S. Santander, Latinoamerica y la Unión Europea. Sus vínculos para un nuevo despertar, 19(1) Foreign Aff.
Latinoamérica 59–66 (2019).
20 In contrast with most Latin American countries, Mexico elected (2018) a centre-left president,
although it seems unlikely this will affect negotiations with the EU.
21 European Commission, EU-Chile Trade Talks: Commission Releases Its Proposals and Reports About
Progress, European Commission (6 Feb. 2018), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=
1793 (accessed 20 June 2019).
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European food products or problems linked to the protection of intellectual
property in Mexico) as well as to get tariffs lowered on agricultural products,
protection of geographical indications (food specialities and drinks typical of certain
regions in the EU), plus opening new markets in the fields of services and public
procurement, and protecting European investments.22
Given the trade war that is being driven by the US’ neo-mercantilist policy
under Trump, the Juncker Commission aimed to prioritize trade talks with
Mercosur. For that purpose, the EU authorities sought to take advantage of the
‘rightwards shift’ of Mercosur countries,23 a shift that has led to the election of pro-
business governments with corporate projects that are market-oriented and favour-
able for policies of economic openness and structural adjustment. The Juncker
Commission’s determination to conclude a trade agreement with Mercosur paid
off, as this was concluded in June 2019. This was a real feat for the European
Commission, not least because the EU and Mercosur negotiated this agreement for
twenty years exactly. For the Commission, this achievement will only be fully
realized on the day when the agreement is ratified, which is unlikely to be easy (see
below). However, once it comes into force, this agreement will create a free-trade
area of 770 million citizen-consumers, with a GDP of over USD 20,000 billion. In
doing so, the EU has succeeded in projecting itself as the spearhead of global free
trade, while securing a place in Latin America’s largest market against Chinese and
US competitors. However this agreement comes with quotas: some South
American products that are considered too competitive will be taxed from a certain
threshold (beef, poultry, and sugar). It will also provide for a system of phasing out
tariffs on exports of EU food and drink, so it covers issues as varied as agricultural
goods, manufactured products (automotive industry), direct foreign investment,
liberalization of services, rules on protecting investment and services, public
procurement, geographical indications for agricultural products as well as intellec-
tual property rights.24
As shown by the content of these tricky talks, the strategic challenge for the
EU is more linked to non-tariff issues than the tariff ones. The aim then is to get
the third parties to accept the EU’s preferences on trade and industrial standards.
This strategy for disseminating international standards that regulate the European
market must enable the bloc to better position itself in the power play of the
international political economy and competition that pits the EU against the
22 European Commission: New EU-Mexico Agreement. The Agreement in Principle, European Commission
18 p (23 Apr. 2018).
23 Mercosur includes Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. Venezuela is the fifth member of
Mercosur. However, it was suspended from the bloc in 2017. The country has also never been part
of the trade negotiations between the EU and Mercosur.
24 European Commission, Key Elements of the EU-Mercosur Trade Agreement, European Commission (28
June 2019).
EU IN GLOBAL AFFAIRS 11
world’s major powers. So the spearhead role played by the EU and its Member
States, through the European Commission, in developing global competition and
its regulation helps to promote liberal economic policies that govern the European
single market. Moreover this role seeks to legitimize the need to integrate all the
world’s nations into the global market. This initiative closely matches the
announced objectives of the European treaties, which view European trade policy
as a lever for developing world trade (see Article 206, TFEU). Furthermore,
European Commission communications in 201025 and 2015,26 the ‘new genera-
tion’ agreements27 it is negotiating, as well as the ‘Trade Package’ announced by
the Commission in September 2017,28 aim to boost the promotion of the EU’s
trade agenda internationally and to strengthen its power in world trade.
Finally, it is worth noting here two points related to the implications of Brexit in
the CCP and in the EU role at the forefront of the globalization: first, as an
independent trade policy actor, the United Kingdom (UK) should negotiate the
terms and concessions of the trade agreements already concluded by the EU. The
UK does not have the EU’s attractiveness in terms of economic size and of consumer
buying power. In that sense, this process will be slow-moving, long-time spending and
hesitant depending on the UK negotiating influence and the willingness and trade
agenda of other countries. Second, the common wisdom is that the loss of the free-
trader UK will push the EU in a somewhat less liberal policy direction. Taking into
account that the UK represents 16% of the Gross Domestic Product of the EU, Brexit
could have an implication in the EU international negotiating leverage. However,
since 2016, the Brexit impact on the trade discourse and practice of the EU has the
opposite effect.29 The Brexit, seen as an isolationist practice, has represented the need
for the European trade policymakers to become passionate political entrepreneurs
promoting both EU economic attractiveness and free trade based on reciprocity,
principle of predictability and loyalty to mutual rules. As stressed by Cecilia
Malmström the former trade Commissioner, ‘we made clear where we stand – pro-
gressive, open, global traders. Responsible traders. Since flying that flag, countries are
lining up with us, and our trade agenda has never been busier’.30 In this view, Brexit
25 European Commission, Trade, Growth and World Affairs. Trade Policy as a Core Component of the EU’s
2020 Strategy, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Brussels COM(2010)
612 final (2010), 22 p.
26 European Commission: Trade for All. Towards a More Responsible Trade and Investment Policy, European
Union, 40 p (2015).
27 Agreements aimed at lowering the tariff and non-tariff barriers.
28 European Commission, State of the EU 2017 – Trade Package, European Union (14 Sept. 2017).
29 F. De Ville & G. Siles-Brügge, The Impact of Brexit on EU Trade Policy, 7(3) Pol. & Governance 7–18
(2019).
30 C. Malmström, Transforming Trade (Humboldt University, Berlin 15 Oct. 2018), https://trade.ec.
europa.eu/doclib/docs/2018/october/tradoc_157443.pdf (accessed 8 Nov. 2019).
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has so far strengthened the EU’s determination to deploy an ambitious foreign trade
policy, in the recent conclusion of major free-trade agreements as well as for preser-
ving multilateralism.
4 THE EU, A SHAKEN COMMERCIAL POWER
In recent years, three key political factors have shaken up the objectives and
influence of the CCP. There is a risk of further disruption of the EU’s trade
power by these factors: the fast rise of new trade and economic powers, such as
China; the new neo-mercantilist policy of the US under the Trump administra-
tion; and the centrifugal actions and political divisions within the EU.
4.1 THE RISE OF NEW POWERS: The CHINESE CHALLENGE
The first international factor at play here is the diffusion of power in the global political
economy. So far, this has been to the disadvantage of the traditional powers and
especially of Europe’s national economies. This diffusion of power can notably be seen
in the rise of new powers. They are led by powers in Asia, including China and India,
which are seeking to develop their presence on the world’s different continents and to
maximize their respective economic and trade interests, to diversify their external
relations, to forge new international alliances and to encourage changes in the inter-
national economic and political structures with a view to achieving a more balanced
share of global power.31 The EU and its Member States increasingly face this
competition and are losing markets in Africa, Latin America and Asia to the new
trading powers. For instance, China’s expansion in Latin America over the last fifteen
years has resulted in China displacing the Europeans as that continent’s second trade
partner behind the US. More specifically, Chinese-Latin American trade exchange
stood at USD 250 billion in 2017 compared with USD 10 billion in 2000. China is
strengthening its presence on the continent by signing bilateral trade agreements, in
addition to making loans and investments worth several dozen billion euro. For several
countries in Latin America, China is now the main trading partner – especially Brazil,
Chile and Peru. Similarly, Chinese-African trade was below USD 4 billion in 1995.
Today it’s around USD 170 billion.32
31 S. Santander, The EU and the Shifts of Power in the International Order: Challenges and Responses, 19(1)
Eur. Foreign Aff. Rev. 65–81 (2014); M. Rewizorski, The European Union and the BRICS. Complex
Relations in the Era of Global Governance 192 (New York, Springer 2015).
32 G. G. Müller, J. Wouters, J.-C. Defraigne, S. Santander & K. Raube, The EU-Latin American Strategic
Partnership: State of Play and Ways Forward, European Parliament: Directorate-General for External
Relations, PE 578.028, 89 (July 2017); L. Chen, China, Africa Trade Volumes Rises 14% to 170b, China
Daily (29 Aug. 2018).
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Moreover, the key strategic pillar of China’s trade policy is now based on the
‘New Silk Road’ project or the ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ (BRI).33 This plan includes
two projects: ‘an economic silk road’ stretching from China to Europe through
Central Asia and ‘a maritime silk road’ from South East Asia to the Mediterranean
via the Indian Ocean, the Gulf and Suez Canal and now towards the East by
extending its influence as far as Latin America. Launched by Chinese President Xi
Jinping in 2013, this initiative is a flagship mega-project for interstate trade exchange. It
will stimulate the flow of capital, goods and services between China and 126 trading
partners. The BRI notably focuses on the development and reinforcement of inter-
connected infrastructures plus road, energy, rail and port projects. As the US pulled
out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership34 in 2017 and as negotiations on a transatlantic
trade and investment partnership between the US and the EU are on hold,35 the BRI
is the only mega-project for regional trade cooperation being turned into a reality.
In light of frequent changes to this Chinese project and its scale, nobody can yet
predict how it will evolve. Is it simply an initiative for economic regionalization
designed to create commercial opportunities for large state groups and Chinese
businesses that have reached production overcapacity? Or is it a project for political
and strategic integration aimed at restructuring the scales of regional and international
cooperation? Given China’s trade ambitions, the EU and its Member States are
looking to come up with answers and to roll out a strategy. Nevertheless, the EU’s
current strategy is noticeably ambivalent. China is the target of strong criticism from
the EU, as the bloc’s authorities believe that European companies often face
‘discriminatory, unpredictable and burdensome’ trade procedures as well as restric-
tions on their investments and mandatory technology transfers that benefit the
Chinese market36;these criticisms have also been addressed to China by US autho-
rities in the Trump administration. It is revealing that the 2019 report from the
Commission on Trade and Investment Barriers explicitly stressed that ‘China has
taken over as the country with the highest stock of recorded barriers, with 37
obstacles hindering EU export and investment opportunities’.37
33 W. A. Callahan, China’s ‘Asia Dream’: The Belt Road Initiative and the New Regional Order, 1(3) Asian J.
Comp. Pol. 226–243 (2016); P. Braga & K. Sangar, Strategy Amidst Ambiguity: The Belt and Road and
China’s Foreign Policy Approach to Eurasia, 1 J. Cross-Reg. Dialogues (2019).
34 A. Vlassis, Le projet du partenariat transpacifique: vers une restructuration des échelles de coopération régionale et
internationale ?, in Concurrences régionales dans un monde multipolaire émergent 285–298 (S. Santander ed.,
Peter Lang, 2016).
35 F. de Ville, T.T.I.P.: The Truth About the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 192 (Cambridge,
Polity Press 2016).
36 European Commission, EU-China – A Strategic Outlook, European Commission and HR/VP con-
tribution to the European Council, 6 (12 Mar. 2019).
37 European Commission, Report from the Commission to the Parliament and the Council on Trade and
Investment Barriers 1 January 2018-31 December 2018 6 (Brussels 2019).
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On this topic, at the EU-China Summit in April 2019 – and after Europe
applied pressure – the Chinese prime minister Li Keqiang pledged to help
strengthen international rules for industrial subsidies under the WTO reform. In
a similar vein, since 2013, the EU and China have negotiated a Comprehensive
Investment Agreement. The latter is an EU immediate priority ‘towards the
objective of deepening and rebalancing its relationship with China’.38 The goal
of the agreement is to design common standards for investment protection and
predictable long-term access to EU and Chinese markets, replacing the existing
investment treaties between China and EU Member States with one single agree-
ment covering all EU Member States. However, the BRI illustrates a lack of
consensus among the EU Member States. They decided to advance in scattered
order and to join the Chinese initiative separately, preferring bilateral trade part-
nerships with China instead of promoting a common and global strategy on this
issue (see below).
4.2 US NEO-MERCANTILIST POLICY
A second international factor affecting the EU and its Member States is the Trump
administration’s ‘America first’ policy.39 It is intentionally nationalist, unilateralist
and unpredictable – meaning it rejects the multilateral order based on compromise,
negotiation, cooperation and respect for international law. Because of this world
view – which is based on power relations, reason of State and the unilateral use of
force – the Trump administration dismisses the usefulness and effectiveness of
international and regional organizations. This calls into question the institutiona-
lization of multilateralism in all its forms, as seen for example in this administra-
tion’s willingness to undermine the operations of the WTO’s Dispute Settlement
Body (DSB) by blocking the reappointment of its judges.40 This attitude is a major
concern for European bodies, as indicated by the response of Cecilia Malmström,
the EU Trade Commissioner under the Juncker Commission (2014-2019), who
said the US could effectively be ‘killing the WTO from the inside.’41 Moreover
the US, which for a long time supported the construction of the EU, is now
banking on the bloc’s destabilization or even its crumbling, if we are to believe the
38 European Commission, Elements for a New EU Strategy on China, JOIN(2016) 30 final, 6 (Brussels
2016).
39 J. Solal-Arquet & D. Tersen, Trump et l’avenir de la politique commerciale européenne, 1 Politique étrangère
85–97 (2017).
40 R. McDougall, Crisis in the WTO. Restoring the WTO Dispute Settlement Function, 194 CIGI Papers 28
(Oct. 2018).
41 L. Doncel, Cuenta atrás para evitar el fin del gran juez del comercio mundial (El País 24 June 2019).
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messages of Donald Trump or his former political mentor, Stephen Bannon, as sent
to Europe’s populist and Europhobe parties.42
For the Trump administration, the EU – in much the same way as China – is
an ‘enemy’, in other words a competitor threatening US industry and therefore US
economic and commercial interests. The world is viewed as a zero-sum game with
winners and losers. Therefore, unlike a liberal-inspired cooperation based on the
search for absolute gains and a collective optimum that is inaccessible by unilateral
behaviour, the Trump administration fears that its partners are overtaking the US
in terms of relative capacities. So it views international relations as a game based on
exclusively relative gains that cannot be increased for two or more states at the
same time.43
The EU is among the main actors targeted by the Republican government’s
neo-mercantilist policies, which highlight a radicalization of commercialism free
from reciprocity and multilateralism. Built around a purely transactional strategy,
these policies are designed to stimulate growth of the domestic market, to promote
US companies’ exports and to discourage imports by imposing customs barriers.
The EU quickly responded to the trade war launched by the US administra-
tion and its policy of raising US tariffs on European products (steel and alumi-
nium). It adopted retaliatory measures against US goods – some of which are very
iconic (jeans, bourbon, Harley-Davidson motorbikes) and which are made in US
States that voted for Trump – and it brought the case before the WTO’s DSB.
However, the EU ensured a channel remained open for bilateral dialogue with the
US, in order to try and find amicable solutions.
To defuse transatlantic tensions, the EU and its Member States are also eager
to restart negotiations with the US. The aim is to revive a project dating back to
the 1990s, for the conclusion of an ambitious trade agreement based on sharing and
mutual respect for common rules. These were the words of European Commission
President Juncker during his visit to President Trump in July 2018. The EU and
US agreed not to announce new sanctions as long as the transatlantic negotiations
are re-engaged and agreed that they would aim to reduce tariffs on industrial
goods – such as cars, regulatory cooperation, an increase in European imports of
liquefied natural gas, and reform of the WTO. The movement in this direction has
continued through other meetings between the US Trade Representative Robert
Lighthizer and the EU Trade Commissioner. The negotiators aim not to exclude
any subject from the agenda.
42 C. Maza, Exiled by Trump, Steve Bannon Could Be About to Rise Again in Europe, Newsweek (25 May
2019).
43 Santander, supra n. 19, at 62–63.
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However, before concluding a transatlantic trade agreement, the parties will
also have to get beyond the Trump government’s distrust in the EU and numerous
hurdles that the former administrations on both sides of the Atlantic have been
incapable of overcoming. On the American side, public procurement is still a very
thorny subject, as the authorities are influenced by the ‘buy American’ thinking
rooted in the doctrine of ‘America first’. For the Europeans, agriculture remains a
very sensitive subject, due to phytosanitary issues raised by chlorinated chickens,
genetically modified organisms or beef treated with growth hormones – all from
US farms.
Continued US pressure on the EU also does not help. In seeking to promote
its neo-mercantilist policy, the US is adopting measures that aim to inconvenience
or even destabilize the bloc. An example was the decision taken in December 2018
by the Trump government to downgrade, without notifying the interested party,
the diplomatic status of the EU delegation in Washington to that of a simple
international organization. Yet since 2016, this delegation had been accorded a
status comparable to that of a State. The US also increased commercial pressure on
Europe and this pressure reached a new peak. After receiving from its Department
of Commerce a report that said European cars pose a ‘threat to US national
security’, the Trump administration announced that it wanted to impose new
sanctions on this sector. This sparked new panic in the EU, notably because
these threats divide more than they unite its various bodies.
4.3 CENTRIFUGAL EFFECTS AND POLITICAL DIVISIONS
Europe is struggling to come up with a plan to deal with this US intimidation and
China’s destabilizing ambitions – which have even created a centrifugal effect in
the bloc. This underlines the limits facing the EU in its international work and
relations with other powers. The great challenge for the EU is to act together and
to formulate a coordinated response under pressure and in a hurry: a situation like
this is far less common for a traditional state-type power.
In this tussle between the EU and US, the bloc is at a disadvantage, being
weighed down by its bureaucracy and institutions. As such, the European
Commission depends on the Council of the EU to get its negotiating mandate.
The Commission also relies on the Council and the European Parliament to ratify
any agreements that it negotiates. Yet the Council and Parliament are often
divided on issues and these divisions are increasing in line with the pressure
being exerted by the Trump administration on Europe. In the Council, some
States, among them Germany, are very worried about their car industry, and have
called for a quick decision so that the Commission can start negotiations with the
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US. Yet those backing this approach supported by the Commission are forgetting
that the Europeans had committed to comply with the Paris climate agreement as a
precondition to any new free-trade agreement. Following France’s lead, other
experts reckon there is no great hurry and that Europe’s agricultural interests
must be protected. The planned trade agreement with the US has also divided
the European Parliament, which has not yet managed to adopt a common position
on the official opening of transatlantic trade talks.44 The Parliament only has a
consultative role on this subject, but it will have the final say once the free-trade
agreement has been concluded, because the Parliament must ratify it.45
The ‘BRI’ is another area highlighting political tensions between the Member
States. The EU response to China’s political offensive has revealed a variable
geometry in the bloc’s action. In 2012, China signed memoranda of understanding
with sixteen Central and East European countries, including eleven EU Member
States46 and five countries in the Western Balkans.47 For the BRI mega-project,
this alliance – known as the ‘16+1’ – has made promoting trade and investments
one of its major priorities. Similarly the European Commission and several
European countries, such as France and Spain, are keen to forge coordinated EU
action in the face of China’s initiatives: this will require the necessary reciprocity in
the bilateral economic relationship between the EU and China. Nor do these
countries envisage joining the Chinese project. On the other hand, European
countries such as Greece, Portugal and just recently Italy have decided to be part
of this major Chinese geopolitical and economic project, in the hope of benefiting
from Chinese investments, destabilizing the EU’s common trade policy and under-
mining the EU’s capacity to ‘speak as one voice’. Consequently, supporters of a
unified approach to China, such as the European Commission and its European
External Action Service, have begun to be more critical of the BRI project.48 In
blunt terms, they see it as a threat to European unity.49
The trade agenda promoted by the Commission and Member States also has
its critics. Discontent is growing among some societal groups and members of both
national and European parliaments. They are challenging the EU’s trade policy for
its lack of transparency and the opaque nature of trade negotiations. This has led to
44 While a majority of MEPs refused to give the negotiation mandate to the Commission, another
majority afterwards was opposed to definitively abandoning the talks.
45 On the Parliament’s powers see A. Ripoll Servent, The Role of the European Parliament in International
Negotiations After Lisbon, 21(4) J. Eur. Pub. Pol’y 568–586 (2014).
46 Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovenia
and Slovakia.
47 Albania, North Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia.
48 See European Commission, supra n. 36.
49 See European Parliament, China, the 16+1 Format and the EU, European Parliament, PE 625.173, 3
(Sept. 2018).
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uncertainty about the process of ratifying and implementing agreements that have
been or are being concluded. As an example, the European Parliament rejected the
Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement in 2012, even though this was signed off by
the European Commission and most EU Member States.
We should also mention the Parliament of Wallonia, which was opposed to
some provisions in the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade
Agreement (CETA). In October 2016, it blocked ratification of the agreement
for several days, resulting in a controversy about the powers and role of national
and sub-national parliaments in the process. The sub-national parliaments wanted
more parliamentary control over the negotiation of such agreements. So the EU
recently considered addressing investment provisions in separate agreements. It
therefore distinguishes between agreements on the basis of the sharing of com-
mercial competencies with the Member States. Against that background, in 2018
the EU set up an expert group on free-trade agreements, with a view to strength-
ening dialogue with civil society organizations and thus improving the transpar-
ency of decision-making.
Fragmentation of the ninth legislature of the European Parliament, which
opened on 2 July 2019, can also be seen as an illustration of centrifugal effects. For
the first time, the European People’s Party and the Progressive Alliance of Socialists
and Democrats lost their absolute majority in the Parliament and thus their
historical domination. So the new legislature is notable for the rise of political
groups which, in spite of their ideological differences and divergent political
origins, could very well act as brakes on the development and setting up of the
bloc’s CCP.50
First of all, the new legislature has seen the consolidation of eurosceptic groups
such as the ‘Europe of Nations and Freedom’ (recently renamed ‘Identity and
Democracy’) and ‘Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy’. Although they
have different views on other political issues, they all tend to distrust the EU
institutions and any coordinated action by the EU Member States on trade. Their
goal is to limit the bloc’s CCP and to oppose the conclusion of preferential
agreements, because they are against the setting up of any common European
action.
The Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance, followed by the
Confederal Group of the EU Left – Nordic Green Left, see free-trade agreements
as a threat to European standards on the environment, employment, health and
food security. With 116 MEPs, these two groups can influence the orientation of
50 Regarding the European political groups and trade agreements, see also A. Vlassis, The European
Parliament as an Actor in the Global Governance of Culture: From Voice to Influence?, in Culture, Sociétés et
Numérique 13–46 (M. Rioux, D. Tchéhouali & F. Verdugo eds, Montréal, Editions IEIM 2017).
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debates in the Parliament and demand significant concessions. Take for example
their fierce opposition to the plan to include a dispute settlement system between
investors and States in the trade agreements negotiated by the EU with third
parties.
Lastly, given a steady decline in the number of MEPs, the Progressive Alliance
of Socialists and Democrats may gradually change its attitude along with the
development of the CCP. In the Parliament, this group formed an atypical alliance
with the European People’s Party, the European Conservatives and Reformists,
and the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (recently renamed ‘Renew
Europe’) – in favour of strengthening the CCP and promoting economic partner-
ships. However, the socialist group could now stand apart from this alliance, by
becoming increasingly critical of certain aspects of the CCP. Signs of this split have
been more and more visible in recent Parliament votes on European trade agree-
ments. In February 2017, during the vote on an economic partnership with
Canada and going against the group’s instructions, sixty-six socialist MEPs voted
against and thirteen MEPs abstained. Secondly, in December 2018, during the vote
on the trade agreement with Japan, the group recorded thirty-two votes against
this and fifteen abstentions. Thirdly, in February 2019 and again not following the
group’s instructions, sixty-one socialist MEPs voted against the trade agreement
between the EU and Singapore, while ten abstained.51
Within the European Parliament, there has also been some reluctance to sign
the trade agreement with Mercosur. There is no universal enthusiasm for this
agreement52. The concerns expressed here by MEPs have not been limited to
globalization and the spearheading role that the European Commission seeks to
play in this field. Plus there are many other players deeply worried about the EU/
Mercosur trade agreement – among them European farmers fearful of unfair
competition from South American countries. The European agriculture lobby
represented by Copa-Cogeca has always opposed such an agreement and is now
organizing to block its ratification. Some European civil society groups are also
highly critical of this trade deal, as underlined by an open letter sent by 340 NGOs
to the EU authorities just before the conclusion of negotiations.53 They worry
about the negative consequences of an agreement like this on the climate and they
are not convinced the trade deal includes sufficient guarantees on respecting
human rights. Lastly, this agreement has also raised concerns among several EU
51 Authors’ research results based on Vote Watch Europe data.
52 See S. Santander, Can Regional Blocs (Still) Talk with Each Other? The Euro-Mercosur Relationship, 2/33
(459), World Affairs 83-92 (2016).
53 Open Letter, 340+ Organisations Call on the EU to Immediately Halt Trade Negotiations with Brazil,
Friends of the Earth of Europe (17 June 2019), http://www.foeeurope.org/sites/default/files/eu-us_
trade_deal/2019/joint-letter-brazil-eu-mercosur.pdf (accessed 29 June 2019).
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Member States, especially France, Ireland, Poland and Belgium. Most likely the
entry into force of this agreement will prove difficult, as it must be ratified by each
one of the EU’s Member States as well as the European Parliament and the
national parliaments.
5 CONCLUSIONS AND PERSPECTIVES
The three factors we have analysed (the rise of new powers, the USs’ neo-mercanti-
list policies, and political divisions within the EU) have shaken up the scope and
objectives of the CCP. However, they have also reinforced the EU’s determination
to continue deploying an offensive foreign trade policy, in the negotiation of
bilateral and interregional free-trade agreements as well as for preserving multi-
lateralism. There are certainly doubts about the bloc’s ability to provide quick and
effective responses to the challenges posed by the decentralization of global
power – especially due to the bureaucratic nature of the EU’s institutions and
divisions within the bloc itself (the rise of critics and euroscepticism). Yet we cannot
overlook the fact the EU is losing ground due to globalization – a trend forcing the
bloc to rethink, relaunch and/or update its trade alliances. Furthermore, recent
initiatives driven by the EU’s need for strategic autonomy should be seen as attempts
to respond to China’s commercial ambitions and to the USs’ neo-mercantilist shift as
well as the threats posed by that country to global interdependence.
Consequently, the EU’s prospects of remaining a top trading power may be
shaped by three main challenges. Firstly, the steady rise of euroscepticism and neo-
mercantilist pressures could seriously hinder the CCP’s formulation and implemen-
tation. The reinforcement of eurosceptic parties in the European Parliament – plus
political groups increasingly reticent about and critical of the promotion of trade
agreements – could shake up the ambitious agenda and priorities of the CCP
internationally. Secondly, unlike the Trump administration, the EU promotes
trade that is regulated by common standards, collective decision-making procedures,
convergence of partner expectations and the principle of predictability. Without
doubt, the CCP’s strategies and the EU’s international influence in its foreign
economic relations will largely depend on the scope, intensity and duration of the
foreign trade policy turnaround of the US. Last but not least, China’s increasingly
dynamic commercial expansion could encourage the EU to forge more and more
bilateral and interregional trading partnerships with the rest of the world, while also
encouraging the bloc to toughen the CCP. Additionally, given China’s trade
policy – which has repeatedly been accused of unfair practices (i.e. forced technology
transfer) and unfair competition (government subsidies to Chinese companies) – the
EU seems willing to adopt retaliatory measures but also to pursue a trade path based
on reciprocity and loyalty to mutual rules.
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